Righting past wrongs: Can reparatory justice be reconciled with Christian understandings of non-heritable guilt?
The recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Samoa issued a communiqué, which was signed by all fifty-six leaders present, stating that the time has come for a “meaningful, truthful and respectful conversation” about reparations for the Atlantic slave trade.
Many Commonwealth governments now argue that Britain should not merely apologise for the treatment of many thousands of historic individuals, but should also make a financial contribution to their nations for its involvement. What goes for Britain could easily soon apply to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and other historically white majority, post-imperial states. As the novelist Lionel Shriver has put it, “heritable guilt is in vogue”.
Arguments for and against “reparatory justice” are replayed endlessly, and that seems set now to continue. The argument in favour rests ultimately on institutional responsibility and continuity. The awful suffering that many sold into slavery endured was a crime against humanity at an enormous scale. The British state then has become the British state now. It remains liable.
Arguments against refute this. The continuity of institutions within society is always a chimera. Who could seriously argue that the British government now bears any similarity to the English crown picked up by William the Conqueror (for all that there is a line of succession from William to our present sovereign)? Similarly, and to cite the example of an even longer-standing institution, is the papacy of Pope Francis really that of Pope Innocent III or Saint Peter?
Churches, governments and monarchies are incentivised to stress their endurance and longevity. However, this has always been connected more to ideology than practicality. We need not take their propaganda at face value. Every change of persons and personnel changes an institution. Quite soon it is transformed into a quite different institution, albeit with the same name and insignia. The fact that such changes are partial, gradual and multifarious does not render the discontinuities any less significant.
Holding the British government accountable for the actions of its distant predecessors is no more reasonable than blaming one generation of a family for the behaviour of long dead ancestors — at least, according to this line of argument. Which brings us to the Christian dimension to the scenario. It is a fundamental principle of Christian moral teaching that we are each responsible for our own sins. We do not have to atone for those of our fathers. Christ died on the cross for this.
Adam’s original sin was expiated by Jesus’ suffering and our redemption. The consistency with which the Apostles and their successors have preached Christ’s gospel does not invalid its essential message. We all have a personal relationship with God. It is God’s forgiveness that counts.
The origins of ancestral sin
Ancestral sin has always been a powerful concept within human societies. Its origins lie in diverse ancient societies and in the Bible. Think of the tragedies inflicted on the House of Cadmus of Thebes or during the Trojan War’s trail of destruction in mythic Greek literature.
Likewise, vendetta, blood feud and other “medieval” practices also saw different kinship groups mete out cycles of violence and retribution on each other. Icelandic sagas, precursors and inspiration to the world of Game of Thrones, present a suitably gory literary example of this. Antisemitism — that ancient evil which posits that today’s Jews bear collective guilt for their forebears’ role as Christ-killers — is another sinister, ubiquitous, sickening one.
The Bible’s own key passage may come in Exodus 20:5:
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.
Or else Exodus 34:7:
[The LORD] does not leave the guilty unpunished; he punishes the children and their children for the sin of the parents to the third and fourth generation.
Such passages require interpretation, and their exegesis is far from an exact science. A long tradition associates them with the legend of the Fall: Adam’s disobedience to God condemned man.
Reading these passages in such a way for sure provides an explanatory framework for God’s jealousy, and for Jewish suffering. But Christian teaching’s critical innovation was that God’s sacrifice of his own son changed the paradigm. Do we need to understand punishment as an active process in these texts? Might it merely refer to the long pall the past casts over innocent lives?
The Old Testament was, in fact, always ambivalent about collective punishment. Deuteronomy 24:16, for instance, proclaims that “parents are not to be put to death for their children, nor children put to death for their parents; each will die for their own sin”. The reasons for such hesitation are obvious. Not only does it go against our sense of natural justice to condemn people for events over which they have had no agency, but it is highly destructive of the social fabric to identify a potentially infinite chain of persons as fair game for retribution.
The move from such collective and enduring notions of guilt to the idea of individual responsibility was a major civilisational advance within classical antiquity — one which allowed for artistic, cultural, and spiritual flourishing. The fact that the rise of the individual was not perfectly completed before the barbarians reached the Roman gate does not detract from the importance of the ethical principle the ancients sponsored. The last two thousand years have witnessed its steady, though certainly far from linear, diffusion as a foundational idea in our social contract.
The moral hazard of making people accountable
Various historians are trying to draw attention to the other problems of holding today’s Britain accountable for historic slavery — just see the recent pieces by Robert Tombs and David Abulafia. Some of their arguments are important, if not particularly morally grounded: for instance, the claim that the slave trade seems to have benefited particular individuals rather than British society as a whole.
Present-day citizens of today’s Commonwealth countries also descend not just from slaves, but from their owners. Go back enough generations and we are all the descendants of the same common ancestors. How could you separate the deserving from the undeserving? Where would that process end?
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Other arguments made are more pertinent to the discussion here. Britain was the first society to condemn and eradicate human slavery, at great financial cost. That act of moral courage ought to count for something. Just as importantly, the moral hazard of endlessly sitting in judgement of our ancestors ought to concern us. Are there even any suitable criteria for establishing which of the multiplicity of historic grievances against them should be re-opened and which should be left to lie?
Slavery was made illegal throughout the British empire more than two hundred years ago. Those involved in the trade in slaves are long since gone. So are their children and grandchildren. In the recent past, only those directly affected by specific injustices — the victims of Nazi war crimes, for example — were generally compensated for them. Can we claim that about individuals, some (but, by no means, all) of whose more distant ancestors suffered as slaves? And if we can in this case, then why not in other cases where the gap between then and now is three, four, or five hundred years? Why not a full millennium?
Why should the states where those shipped across the Atlantic were first enslaved and sold be exempt, moreover? Many slaves did not live long enough to reach a British colony. Are their stories and agonies to be overlooked? Many will have had relatives who reached the New World and were scarred by the loss of family members. Once the process of victim identification gets going, there are few objective boundaries by which it might be limited.
Some Australians may feel that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are not so distant. After all, they were the time of our nation’s foundation. They constitute a past that is not dead, not even sleeping. Nevertheless, we need a sense of perspective. Many Britons have no ancestors who played a role in the exploitation of slaves or the colonisation of empire. The early nineteenth-century world has only a weak, heavily mediated effect on their lives — or any of our lives — today.
Our world is shaped far more by what goes on around us now. We need to remind ourselves of this. Focusing too much on our forebears’ sins could itself be a sin if it distracts us from addressing our own faults, omissions and imperfections. Why is the world still such a dangerous and threatening place? Why is there so much violence and poverty? Why do forms of slavery still flourish in some countries? What responsibility should we take for these things, at home or abroad?
We need to get our own world in order before we play a blame game in which our ancestors are the pawns. Let he who is without sin cast the first stone, as someone once put it. Our zeal for righting past wrongs might have no end.
Miles Pattenden is a medieval historian and researcher at Deakin University. He is the author of Electing the Pope in Early Modern Italy, 1450-1700.
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